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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of personal tenure between Audit Partner and Client
CEO on firm’s likelihood to do upward earnings management. Using non financial firms listed on
Indonesia Stock Exchange period 2012 – 2014, this study finds that personal tenure between Audit
Partner and Client CEO have significant positive influence on firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings
management and downward forecast guidance. The results of this study indicate that personal tenure
positively influences both mechanisms of avoiding negative earnings surprises. Furthermore, since the
company's resources in doing both mechanisms are often limited, this study also examines the impact
of personal tenure on firm’s choices between the two mechanisms, by testing whether companies choose
to do downward forecast guidance, but not upward earnings management or using upward earnings
management but not downward forecast guidance. The results show that personal tenure positively
associated with the likelihood of firms doing downward forecast guidance without upward earnings
management. The result indicates that lower independency of the audit partner due to longer tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO encourage management to do earnings management by
avoiding negative earnings surprise.
Keywords: Audit Tenure, Personal Tenure, Earnings Surprise Management

Abstrak
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk meneliti pengaruh personal tenure antara Audit Partner dan
Client CEO terhadap kemungkinan perusahaan untuk melakukan upward earnings management.
Penelitian ini mengambil sampel perusahaan non keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia
periode 2012 - 2014, dan menemukan bahwa personal tenure antara Audit Partner dan Client CEO
memiliki pengaruh positif yang signifikan terhadap kemungkinan perusahaan untuk melakukan upward
earnings management dan downward forecast guidance. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa
personal tenure berpengaruh positif terhadap kedua mekanisme untuk menghindari kejutan laba
negative (negative earnings surprises). Selain itu, karena sumber daya perusahaan dalam melakukan
kedua mekanisme sering terbatas, penelitian ini juga menguji dampak personal tenure terhadap pilihan
perusahaan antara dua mekanisme, dengan menguji apakah perusahaan memilih untuk melakukan
downward forecast guidance, tetapi tidak melakukan upward earnings management atau menggunakan
upward earnings management tetapi tidak menggunakan downward forecast guidance. Hasil penelitian
menunjukkan bahwa personal tenure berhubungan positif dengan kecenderungan perusahaan
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melakukan downward forecast guidance tanpa upward earnings management. Hasil penelitian
menunjukkan bahwa semakin rendah independensi audit partner yang disebabkan masa kerja yang
lama antara Audit Partner dan Client CEO mendorong manajemen untuk melakukan manajemen laba
dengan menghindari kejutan pendapatan negatif.
Kata kunci: Masa Kerja Audit, Masa kerja personal, Manajemen Kejutan Laba

INTRODUCTION
Research on how the company
performs earnings management continues
to grow to date. Research in this area
focuses not only on methods of earnings
management (whether through accrual
mechanisms or real mechanisms), but also
on how firms perform earnings management to meet market expectations
(earnings surprises management). Prior
studies (Matsumoto 2002; Ho et al. 2010)
suggest that companies tend to report
positive earnings surprises instead of
negative earnings surprises. Positive earnings surprises happen when actual earnings reported are higher than analyst
forecast, while negative earnings surprises
happen when actual earnings reported are
lower than the analyst forecast. Because
negative earnings surprises can negatively
affect both firms performance and stock
price, firms tend to avoid negative earnings
surprises.
According to (Ho et al. 2010), there
are two ways to avoid negative earnings
surprises. First, upward earnings management which firms increase their reported
earnings by creating accruals. Accruals earnings management is carried out through
the selection of accounting policies to
achieve a desired financial reporting result.
Second, downward forecast guidance, also
called as expectation management, which
firm’s manager, such as CEO, influence the
analyst to make downward expectation to
avoid negative earnings surprises. The relationship between CEO and analyst can
caused firm’s CEO to have a big influence
on analyst decision. Companies often have
limited resources to do both at the same
time, or if managers do so, then the market
is likely to perceive the behavior as an

opportunistic behavior. In order to avoid
that, then the manager will tend to choose
between upward earnings management and
downward forecast guidance, which sometimes called trade-off between the two
mechanisms. So, trade-off is when manager
avoid negative earnings surprises by using
either upward earnings management or
downward forecast guidance.
One of the mechanism to limit the
earnings game is trough high quality of audit. Firm’s annual audit is designed to
constrain any material misstatement of
earnings reported. Higher quality of audit
will reduce the incidence of earnings
management. Audit quality is affected by
audit tenure. (Ho et al. 2010) suggest that
longer firm’s tenure will lead to a better
audit quality. Upward earnings management will be higher in early audit tenure
as (Brown and Pinello 2007) stated that
since earnings management is subject to
audit procedure, increasing audit tenure
further, the upward earnings management
will be substituted by guiding analyst
forecast downward (downward forecast
guidance). Thus, better audit quality might
reduce the firms’ likelihood to do upward
earnings management, but it might increase
firms’ likelihood to do downward forecast
guidance.
Contrast to substitution hypothesis,
(Sankaraguruswamy and Sweeney 2005)
support complementary hypothesis by
suggesting that firms are likely to do both
upward earnings management and downward forecast guidance in order to avoid
negative earnings surprises. Their results
show that company do earnings management using several methods and not just
rely on one single method. Lower monitoring role by auditor due to independency
impairment caused by longer personal
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tenure can provide incentives for managers
to perform earnings management by doing
several methods of earnings management,
including earnings management methods to
avoid negative earnings surprises such as
upward earnings management and downward forecast guidance.
The objective of this paper is to
examine the effect of personal tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO on
earnings management using earnings surprise mechanisms. Different from (Ho et al
2010), this paper uses different aproach to
measure audit tenure. We use individual
audit tenure approach suggested by (Ball et
al. 2015) instead of firms audit tenure. Ball
et al (2015) suggest that longer personal
tenure between Audit Partner and Client
CEO may reduce audit quality due to
independence impairment between the
Audit Partner and Client CEO. Overall, the
purpose of this paper is to examine whether
personal tenure between Audit Partner and
Client CEO following (Ball et al. 2015),
affect firms’ likelihood to do upward
earnings management, downward forecast
guidance, and whether firm choose to do
downward forecast guidance but not
upward earnings management or by doing
upward earnings management but not
downward forecast guidance.
The rotation and restrictions on tenure
of both Public Accounting Firms and Public
Accountant (which refers to the signing Audit Partner) have become a much debated
issue in Indonesia. The regulations regarding the rotation of Public Accountant
and Public Accountant Firms have changed
many times during last ten years. Yet, research on how tenure affect the quality of
earnings in Indonesia mostly focus on tenure between firm and Public Accounting
Firms (firm tenure), not individual tenure.
Research on how Audit Partner and Client
CEO affect manager’s behavior to manage
earnings is limited. In addition, the use of
the Indonesian context in this study is
interesting in view of the fact that the
ownership structure of companies in
Indonesia tends to be owned by families
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and has a high concentration of ownership.
Under such ownership conditions, the CEO
is usually dominated by the family and the
CEO's incentives in earning management
can be different from the context of the
company with scattered ownership as in the
US or UK or other countries.
Using the Indonesia context this study
provides several evidences. This study
shows that personal tenure between Audit
Partner and Client CEO is positively and
significantly affect firms’ likelihood to do
upward earnings management, downward
forecast guidance, and firms’ choices to do
downward forecast guidance without upward earnings management. Our results
suggest that firm’s manager and analyst
may develop certain relationship to avoid
negative earnings surprise. This study
shows that in the context of Indonesia, the
results show that CEOs still have an incentive to conduct earnings management
through negative avoidance earnings surprises and with increasing length of personal tenure will increase the incentive.
This study makes a number of
contributions to the literatures and practice.
For literature this study contributes several
contributions. First, as far as our knowledge, this paper is among the first to study
and provides evidence about the relation
between individual Audit Partner and
Client CEO with the firms’ likelihood to
manage negative earnings surprises mechanisms (upward earnings mana-gement
and downward forecast guidance). Previous
research on audit tenure always uses firm
relationships between Public Accounting
Firm and client entities. Brooks et al. (2013)
examine the tenures of the relationship
between Public Accounting Firm and client
entities on audit quality as measured by
discretionary accrual. While (Davis et al.
2000) measure the relationship between
audit tenure using tenure of Public
Accounting Firm, auditor independence
and earnings management using discretionary accrual proxy. This study incorporates a new relationship model in audit
tenure, an individual relationship between
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Audit Partner and CEO of the company
developed by (Ball et al. 2015) and earnings
management behavior which is manager’s
behavior in avoiding negative earnings
surprise. Second, this study also provides
contribution by using Indonesian context in
examining above relationship. Indonesia as
emerging market provides interesting
context despite of the regulation on audit
tenure. Furthermore, in contrast to (Brown
and Higgins 2005) examining downward
forecast guideline actions by managers in
US firms, research in Indonesia has different contexts with US in aspects such as
investor protection, market efficiency, and
corporate ownership. The Indonesian
context with family-dominated ownership
structure is interesting to examine to see
how CEOs in Indonesia have incentives to
do earnings management by avoiding
negative earnings surprises and how personal tenure can affect it. Brown and
Higgins (2005) state that even in countries
such as US earnings management behaviors
such as the downward forecast guideline
cannot be restricted and there is no regulation governing it, especially in countries with weak investor protection levels
such as Indonesia. In addition, although
many firms are owned by families with concentrated ownership structures, in practice
the measurement of financial performance
based on profit figures and stock prices is
still very important. With the absence of
strong external monitoring from auditors
for companies in Indonesia and with the
incentive of companies to conduct earnings
management through avoiding negative
earnings surprises, this study is expected to
add literature on the relationship between
personal audit tenure and earnings management mechanism with avoiding negative
earnings surprises with Indonesian context.
This research also gives contribution to the
practice. It provides insights for regulator
especially in Indonesia about individual
relationship between Audit Partner and
Client CEO with audit quality, which has
not been regulated yet. Using Indonesia as
the context, this study provides contribution

by giving policy implication on the regulation of audit tenure in Indonesia which
only regulate tenure of audit partner with
the company.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Regulation on Audit Tenure in Indonesia
In Indonesia, the rotation Public
Accountant (which refers to the signing Audit Partner) or Public Accountant Firms is
an issue that is often debated. The regulations regarding the rotation of Public
Accountant and Public Accountant Firms
have changed many times during last ten
years. In 2002, the Decree of the Ministery
of Finance No. 423/KMK.06/2002 set the
general audit services of financial reports of
an entity can be done by the same Public
Accountant Firms with maximum tenure of
five years consecutively and by the same
Public Accountant (signing partner) for
maximum of three years consecutively.
In 2008, the Ministry of Finance published Decree No. 17/PMK.01/2008 which
set an extension of the audit tenure period
for Public Accountant Firms. Public
Accountant Firms were allowed to perform
general audit services for maximum period
of six consecutive years. Public Accountant
Firms were also allowed to provide audit
services to the same client after a paused of
time of one year. The same applies to a
Public Accountant who were allowed to
provide audit services to the same client for
maximum of three years in a row with
intervals of one year.
On April 6th, 2015 the government of
Indonesia issued the Government Regulation No. 20 which revised the period of
rotation for Public Accountant and Public
Accountant Firms. Public Accountant are
allowed to perform audit services with
maximum tenure of five years in a row and
can gives audit services to the same client
after period of two years. However, this
only applies to the entities listed in the
capital market, Bank, Pension Fund
Insurance Company, and State Owned
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Enterprises. Meanwhile, the tenure of
Public Accountant Firms who previously
was limited to six years, now freed from the
rotation, which means that the Public
Accountant Firms can perform audit
services to an entity with unlimited period
of time, as long as the signing partner is rotated with maximum tenure of five years.
Recently in 2017 the Indonesian
government issued the latest regulation
regarding the appointment of auditors
through Financial Services Authority
Regulation (Peraturan Otoritas Jasa
Keuangan/ POJK) No. 13 / POJK.03 / 2017.
The regulation governs the limitation of the
use of audit services from the same public
accountant (signing partner) for the period
maximum of 3 (three) consecutive reporting years. The signing partner may only
give audit service after 2 (two) consecutive
reporting years of cooling-off period. There
is no limitation on the tenure for the public
accountant firms.
The regulation above, opens the
freedom to the Public Accountant Firms to
audit with unlimited tenure, but gives the
limitation only on the signing partner. This
regulation was issued because many practitioners in Indonesia consider previous
regulation was not effective because many
Public Accountant Firms addressing the
rotation rule by changing the partner and
build new Public Accountant Firms partnership in order to change the name of the
firms, even though most of the composition
of an accountant public and the international affiliation are still the same. This is
often called with pseudo rotation.
Despite of this is a frequently debated
issue and the regulation oftenly changes, research on the relationship between tenure
audit and the quality of financial statements
in Indonesia is still very limited. Fitriany et
al. (2015) state that in the pre regulation period (1999-2001), increasingly length of audit tenure, the lower the quality audit. In the
post-regulation period (2004-2008), the
empirical evidence shows a convex relationship between audit tenure and audit
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quality from the side of neutrality and timeliness. Different with this research, Fitriany
et al. (2015) use firm tenure rather than individual tenure.
Up to now, there is no regulation in
Indonesia, and in many countries that regulate the maximum tenure period of the relationship between individual party in the
company and in the audit firms such as tenure between Audit Partner and Client CEO.
The independency of the auditor can be impaired due to close relationship between audit partner and CEO. The longer the tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO the
higher the probability of independency impairment (Ball et al. 2015). Ball et al.
(2015) states that personal tenure between
signing partner and CEO can also impair independency from the auditor thereby decreasing audit quality.
The Relation between Upward Earnings
Management and Downward Forecast
Guidance
Several studies (Matsumoto 2002;
Brown and Pinello 2007; Ho et al. 2010)
state that upward earnings management and
downward forecast guidance are mechanisms on earnings surprise game. Downward forecast guidance is also called as
expectation management, by managers
lowering investors’ earnings expectation by
providing guidance to analysts that are
lower than earnings that can be achieved by
the company. Downward forecast guidance
may become alternative method over
accrual based upward earnings management because of the following reasons.
First, earnings management is subject to
audit procedure and there is a higher requirement on the financial disclosure.
Second, it is difficult for manager to
continously upwardly manage reported
earnings (Li et al. 2005). The choice of
using the earnings management method
shows that between the earnings management method can be either substitute or
complementary to each other.
The substitution mechanism means
that management will choose one method
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against other methods, resulting in a
tradeoff between the two methods. For
example, managers will tend to do accrual
based upward earnings management, but
because of the reasons above, the downward forecast guidance method becomes a
substitution of management’s upward earnings management method. In comparison
with firms unaudited quarterly result
(Brown and Pinello 2007) also find that
firms annual audit will decrease the firms
likelihod to do upward earnings management, but will increase firms’ likelihood
to do downward forecast guidance. Their
evidence later concludes that there is
substitution effect between upward earnings management and downward forecast
guidance.
In contrast, (Sankaraguruswamy and
Sweeney 2005) suggest that firms are likely
to do both upward earnings management
and downward forecast guidance in order to
avoid negative earnings surprises. Their result supports complementary hypothesis rather than substitution hypothesis. It shows
that company do earnings management
using several methods and not just rely on
one single method. Mikhail et al. (1999)
show that analyst turnover is related to
analysts’ forecast accuracy, which suggests
that an analyst is concerned about managers
that involve the analysts in making large
forecast errors. In response of this, firms
managers and analysts may develop a
symbiotic relationship regarding earnings
announcements and earnings forecasts. If
managers plan to announce earnings that
are lower than analyst forecast, they have
an incentive to manage analyst expectations
downward, and they try to manage small
gap differences between earnings reported
and earnings forecast. In addition, to
achieve certain level of earnings, firms
managers will do upward earnings management, but with less extreme.
Until now, as long as the researcher's
knowledge there is no research on the
mechanism of earnings management
through avoidance of negative earnings surprises in Indonesia or in emerging countries

that have some institutional characteristics
that are different from developed countries
like US. However, given that firms in
Indonesia still have incentives for earnings
management, and the company's resources
to perform all the methods of earnings
management are limited as well as the absence of regulation in restrict the manager
in doing so referring to (Brown and Higgins
2005) which state that in countries such as
US, regulatory restrictions for earnings
management behaviour trough method such
as downward forecast guidance even does
not exist), then the behaviour of earnings
management by avoiding negative earnings
surprises in Indonesia allegedly still occur.
The Relation between Audit Tenure and
Audit Quality
There are two opposing views on how
audit tenure affects audit quality (Ball et al.
2015). The first view is the auditor independence hypothesis. The auditor independence hypothesis maintains that auditor
independence, and therefore audit quality,
becomes impaired as the association between the auditor and the client lengthens.
Three argument to support the hypothesis.
First, auditors may develop a “learned confidence” or become too familiar with the
client’s operations. Second, longer auditorclient relationships could lead to the development of person-to-person relations
which can impact an auditor’s objectivity
and therefore independence. Third, as
auditor tenure increases, economic considerations could impact decisions and
conduct as explained in the low balling
practice (DeAngelo 1981).
The second view is the auditor
expertise hypothesis. The auditor expertise
hypothesis maintains that audit quality
increases with auditor tenure as it allows
client specific knowledge and expertise to
develop and increase. This hypothesis is
based on the degree of information
asymmetry between the auditor and the
client, which reduces over time as auditors
acquire client specific knowledge. The
knowledge and expertise are developed
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over repeated audits and create significant
learning curves during the period of audit.
Myers et al. (2003) documented that
longer firms audit tenure associated with
decreased Discretionary Accruals (DA) and
interpret this result as longer audit tenure
positively affect audit quality. While
Johnson et al. (2002) found that longer
firms audit tenure positively affect eanings
management, thus reduce audit quality.
Prior research about audit tenure are
mostly focus only on firms relation. Ball et
al. (2015) extend the study of audit tenure
by examining the individual relationship
between Audit Partner and Client CEO.
They found that individual relationship of
Audit Partner and Client CEO also contribute to affect audit quality. They use
client - CEO as benchmark since it is most
likely that CEO involved in firms decision
on selecting audit firms. The result suggest
that longer personal tenure between Audit
Partner and Client CEO will reduce audit
quality due to independence impairment
between Audit Partner and Client CEO.
Hypothesis Development
Dechow et al. (2003) argue that
avoiding negative earnings surprise is the
biggest concern for firms in 1999 until
2001. It is also supported by (Brown and
Caylor 2005). Using sample from 1996
until 2002, they found that firms are most
likely to avoid negative earnings surprise.
There are two ways firms manage to avoid
negative earnings surprise: upward earnings management and downward forecast
guidance (Matsumot 2002; Ho et al. 2010).
Upward earnings management is measured
by positive discretionary accruals, while
forecast guidance is refer to earnings forecast by analyst. Downward forecast guidance happens when the actual earnings reported is lower than earnings forecast by
analyst.
The first hypothesis of this paper is
about the relation between personal tenure
of Audit Partner and Client CEO with
firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings
management. Ball et al. (2015) find that
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personal tenure between Audit Partner and
Client CEO will reduce audit quality due to
independence impairment of Audit Partner
and Client CEO. Mautz and Sharaft (1961
in Fitriany et al. 2015) state that with the
length of the relationship between auditor
and his client will affect the independence
of the auditor because the auditor’s objectivity will decrease over time. With the
decrease in independence the auditor is no
longer able to conduct audit in high quality,
so that management can perform earnings
management, which in most case by performing upward earnings management. Using
the Indonesian context Fitriany et al. (2015)
states that the audit tenure will reduce the
quality of audits by using earnings management as proxy when the tenure audit has
passed the optimal level. If lower audit
quality associated with higher incidence of
earnings management.
Then our first hypothesis is:
H1: Personal tenure between Audit
Partner and Client CEO is
positively associated with upward
earnings management in order to
avoid negative earnings surprise.
The second hypothesis of this paper is
about the relation between personal tenure
of Audit Partner and Client CEO with
firms’ likelihod to do downward forecast
guidance. Brown and Pinello (2007) suggest that downward forecast guidance is a
substitution mechanism for upward earnings management. They find that in comparison with unaudited quarterly result, annual audit reduces firms’ likelihood to do
upward earnings management, but will increase firms’ likelihood to downward forecast guidance. In the contrary with (Brown
and Pinello 2007), Sankaraguruswamy and
Sweeney (2005) find that firms are likely to
do both upward earnings management and
downward forecast guidance in order to
avoid negative earnings surprises. Their
result supports complementary hypothesis
rather than substitution hypothesis.
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In a context where the role of external
oversight by auditors is relatively low, and
managers have the relatively higher freedom to give downward forecast guidance
(considering there are no regulations that
restrict it) the substitution relationship between the two methods may not necessarily
applicable. In the Indonesian context,
where investor protection is relatively
weak, managers have relatively more freedom to provide a lower forecast guidance to
analysts and the role of auditors to avoid it
is relatively weak. In this condition, the
length of the personal tenure will weaken
monitoring role by the auditor on earnings
management behavior through downward
forecast guidance.
Our second hypothesis is:
H2: Personal tenure between Audit
Partner and Client CEO is positively associated with downward
forecast guidance in order to
avoid negative earnings surprise.
Both hypotheses above assume that
managers have the ability (and resources) to
perform both the earnings management
methods through the avoidance of negative
earnings surprises ie upward earnings
management and downward forecast guidance. If the manager has limited ability or
if managers do both, then the market is
likely to perceived the behavior as an
opportunistic behavior, then the manager is
faced with the choice of one method between the two methods.
In relation to managers’ behavior in
earnings management, the auditor plays a
role in carrying out its external monitoring
function to minimize the opportunistic behavior of the manager. Nevertheless, the
role of auditors leads more to the context of
financial reporting in which the auditor
plays a role in limiting the manager's
opportunistic behavior in upward earnings
management. Auditors are often unable to
supervise manager relationships with
analysts so that the auditor's ability to limit

downward forecast guidance is relatively
small. Therefore, when managers are faced
with a choice of methods, the longer
personal tenure between auditors and CEOs
will cause managers to prefer upward
earnings management rather than downward forecast guidance. The impairment in
auditor independence due to the length of
personal tenure will cause management to
avoid negative earnings surprises by choosing upward earnings management rather
than downward forecast guidance. This
argument shows that the length of personal
tenure negatively impacts the choice of
downward forecast guidance rather than
upward earnings management. Thus the
longer the personal tenure then the company’s likelihood to do upward earnings
management and not do downward forecast
guidance is higher. Therefore, the relationship between personal tenure and tradeoff
between downward forecast guidance and
upward earnings management becomes
negative.
Our third hypothesis is as follow:
H3: For firms conducting trade-off between upward earnings management and downward forecast
guidance, personal tenure between Audit Partner and Client
CEO is negatively associated with
the choice of using downward
forecast guidance but not upward
earnings management in order to
avoid negative earnings surprise.
Recognising that audit expertise may
also be increasing with longer audit firm
tenure based on the auditor expertise view,
we control for the tenure of the relation between the audit firm and the client and audit
firms size to determine whether there are
further benefits arising from audit firm rotation, or whether this would impose additional costs in terms of lower audit quality.

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Desember 2018, Vol. 15, No. 2, hal. 138-163

146

1. Model for upward earnings management
UPWARD_EMit = αo + α1PTENUREit + α2FTENUREit + α3LTGit + α4LITit + α5LABORit
+ α6LNMVit + α7BIG4it + α8LEVERAGEit + α9-15DINDUSTRYit + εit
2. Model for downward forecast guidelines
DOWNWARD_FGit = βo + β1PTENUREit + β2FTENUREit + β3LTGit + β4LITit +
β5LABORit + β6LNMVit + β7BIG4it + β8LEVERAGEit + α915DINDUSTRYit + εit
3. Model for choice of strategy trade-off
CHOICEit = γo + γ1PTENUREit + γ2FTENUREit + γ3LTGit + γ4LITit + γ5LABORit +
γ6LNMVit + γ7BIG4it + γ8LEVERAGEit + α9-15DINDUSTRYit + εit
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection
The data used in this paper is
based on financial reports for all industry,
excluding financial industry, listed in
Indonesia Stock Exchange for period 2012
– 2014. This period was taken to avoid any
regulatory changes related to audit tenure,
given the regulatory changes related to
tenure audit in 2015. We use secondary data
obtained from few sources. We obtain financial report data and earnings announcement date from Thomson Reuters, stock
trading data from Datastream, and EPS
forecast published by analyst was obtained
from I/B/E/S Thomson Reuters.
Our initial sample for H1 contains
1,272 firm-year observations during 20122014. We exclude 240 observations from financial services industries because incentives differ across firms in regulated and
non-regulated industries. We find 492 observations that do not have complete data to
estimate discretionary accruals, individual
tenure, earnings surprises and control variables. Finally, after applying the above criteria, our full sample for testing H1 consists
of 540 observations. To test our second hypothesis, we exclude 228 observations that
do not have complete data of EPS forecast
published by analyst. So that, our full sample for testing H2 consists of 312 observations. To test H3, we further limit our sample from H2 by including only observations
that either upward earnings management or
downward forecast guidance but not both.

Finally, we get full sample consists of 158
data for our H3.
Empirical Model
To examine whether personal tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO
affect firms’ likelihood to do upward
earnings management, downward forecast
guidance, and trade-off choices strategy to
use downward forecast guidance but not
upward earnings management in order to
avoid negative earnings surprises we use
logistic regression between personal tenure
and probability of upward earnings management, downward forecast guidance, and
trade-off choices. We developed the empirical model based on (Ho et al. 2010) that
investigate the effect of audit tenure and
earnings surprise management and modified based on (Ball et al. 2015) to investigate the relationship between personal
tenure and negative earnings surprises avoidance. Our empirical model to test the
relationship between personal tenure and
the likelihood of firms avoiding negative
earnings surprises by doing upward earnings management, downward forecast guideline and the choice of strategy trade-off
are as follow:
Hypothesis 1 is tested by looking at
the significance of α1, where hypothesis 1 is
accepted if α1 is positive. Hypothesis 2 is
tested by looking at the significance of β1,
where hypothesis 2 is accepted if β1 is
positive. Whereas hypothesis 3 is tested by
looking at the significance of γ1, where hypothesis 3 is accepted when γ1 is negative.
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To measure the negative earnings surprises, we follow (Ho et al. 2010).
UPWARD_EM is a dummy variable with
the value of 1 for firms with positive
discretionary accruals, indicating firms’
likelihood to do upward earnings management and value of 0 for firms with
negative discretionary accruals, indicating
firms’ likelihood to do downward earnings
management. DOWNWARD_FG is a
dummy variable with the value of 1 for
firms with recent earnings forecast by
analyst (FORE) is lower than expected
earnings forecast (E[FORE]), and value of
0 for firms with recent earnings forecast by
analyst (FORE) is higher than or equal with
expected earnings forecast (E[FORE]).
CHOICE is variable to identify whether the
firms choose to use downward forecast
guidance and not upward earnings management or vice versa. This variable tends to
capture the method of company use in doing trade-off. CHOICE is measured by a
dummy variable with the value of 1 for
firms using downward forecast guidance,
but not upward earnings management
(DOWNWARD_FG = 1 and UPWARD_EM = 0) and value of 0 for firms
for firms using upward earnings management but not downward forecast guidance (DOWNWARD_FG = 0 and UPWARD_EM = 1).
In empirical model we control the
likelihood of firms to avoid negative earnings surprises by adding several control
variables. First, we control for Audit Firm
Tenure as (Myers et al. 2003) suggest that
longer audit tenure is associated with decreased discretionary accruals, and interpret
this result as longer audit tenure is positively associated with audit quality. In contrast, (Johnson et al. 2002) find that longer
audit tenure is associated with increased
discretionary accruals, and suggest that
longer audit tenure is negatively associated
with audit quality and the lower audit
quality will increase the earnings management or in the other words low audit quality
will provide an opportunity for managers to
avoid negative earnings surprises through

earnings management. Based on (Johnson
et al. 2002), we predict the relationship between firm tenure and manager’s behavior
in avoiding negative earnings surprises is
positive. Following (Ball et al. 2015) audit
firm tenure is measured as the number of
years audit firm (if the audit firm has
foreign audit firm affiliation we measure
based on the tenure of the foreign affiliation) and client firm relationship at the fiscal year end (FTENURE). The FTENURE
are measure start from 2009. Due to the research period used in this study is from
2012 to 2014, the retrospective search to
measure audit tenure over the past five
years is considered adequate.
Second, we control for Growth Prospect. Compared with lower growth prospect firms, higher growth prospect firms
have higher incentive to avoid negative
earnings surprises since they suffer to
higher market assymetric reaction (Skinner
and Sloan 2002). Matsumoto (2002) find
that firms with higher growth prospect are
more likely to do earnings management and
downward forecast. While (Brown and
Pinello 2007) suggest that firms with higher
growth prospect are tends to avoid negative
earnings surprises but negatively associated
with earnings management and forecast
guidance. Growth prospect measured by
market to book ratio (LTG).
Third, we control for Litigation Risk.
A sudden drop in share price at earnings
announcement will lead to shareholder
litigation. Firms with higher shareholder
litigation risk are more likely to avoid
negative earnings surprises (Matsumoto
2002; Ho et al. 2010). Consistent with (Ho
et al. 2010) and (Matsumoto 2002), we
classify firms in biotechnology, computer,
electronic, and retailing as firms with high
shareholder litigation. We use dummy
variable for Litigation Risk (LIT). Value
one assigned for firms in biotechnology,
computer, electronic, and retailing industry,
and value zero assigned for otherwise.
Next we control for the Implicit Claim
to Employee as Brown et al. (1995) and
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Matsumoto (2002) suggest that firms with
higher dependence on implicit claim to employee are tends to beat the analyst forecast
and avoid negative earnings surprises. Implicit claim to the employee is done when
the employee executes the ownership of
share of the company (e.g. trough employee
stock ownership program). Therefore, firms
that have high implicit claim amounts tend
to try to beat the analyst forecasts and avoid
negative earnings surprises in order for
their stock prices to rise. This variable is
measure by labor intensity, LABOR,
computed as one minus the ratio of gross
Propert, Plant, and Equipment to Total
Asset.
We also control for Firms Size. Although large and small firms have the same
incentive to avoid negative earnings surprises (Llukani, 2013), large firms tend to
be less optimistic in making future financial
report projection. Those firms are easier to
do downward forecast guidance since they
do not need to be involved with earnings
management (Brown and Pinello 2007). In
accordance with (Brown and Pinello 2007;
Matsumoto 2002) found that larger firms
are positively associated with downward
forecast guidance. Firms size measured by
using the log of market value of equity
(LNMV).
To control the audit quality, we use
Auditor Size as a proxy. Prior research
(Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999)
document that larger audit firms are positively associated with audit quality. We
defined size of audit firms as Big 4 and non
Big 4 membership. Value one assigned to
firms using Big 4 auditor, and value zero
assigned to firms using non Big 4 auditor
(BIG4). Previous research also suggest that
leverage is positively associated with firms
earnings management. Betty and Weber
(2003 find that firms with high leverage are
more likely to do earnings management in
order to avoid debt covenant. However,
(Jellinek, 2007) examine the leverage increases towards earnings management and
concludes that that leverage is negatively
associated with earnings management. In
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order to control the effect of leverage in our
estimation, we use the ratio of long term
debt to total asset (LEV) as control variable.
Last, we also control for industry because the behavior of earnings management
in order to avoid earnings surprises might
different across industry. We include
dummy industry in our model. Industry
classification used in this paper is based on
Indonesian Stock Exchange, consists of 8
(eight) industry : Mining Industry
(MINING), Basic Chemicals (BASICCHEM), Consumption Industry (CONSUMPTION), Service, Trading, and
Investment (STI), Agriculture (AGRI),
Property and Real Estate (PROP), Transportation, Infrastructure, and Utility
(TRANS), and Other (OTHER). We use
TRANS as industry base.
Measurment of Personal Tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO
We measure the personal tenure
between Audit Partner and Client CEO as

the number of years Audit Partner – Client
CEO relationship at the fiscal year end. We
use sample for all industry, exclude
financial industry, in 2012 until 2014.
However, since the mandatory regulation
for Audit Partner rotation in Indonesia is
maximum for 3 years in a row, we trace the
rotation of Audit Partner back from 2009.
Personal tenure is measured using the
number of years of assignment between the
Partner Audit and the Client's CEO. The
following is illustration to calculate the individual tenure between the Partner Audit
and the CEO in this study.
Based on Table 1, it can be seen that
the method of calculating the individual
tenure of Partner Audit and Client's CEO is
based on the relationship between the same
people. For example in 2009, the relationship is between A and X. This relationship
is calculated as 1 year. In 2010, the
relationship is still the same as in 2009,
which is between A and X so that the
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calculation of tenure increased to 2 years. In
2011, the Audit Partner changed to Y, so
the relationship became between A and Y.
This relationship is a new relationship, so
the tenure is again counted as 1 year. Then
in 2012 the relationship goes back to A and
X, continuing the same relationship as in
2009 and 2010 so that its tenure is counted
as 3 years.
Measurement of Upward Earnings
Management
We measure upward earnings management by using discretionary accruals. To
develop proxy for discretionary accruals,
we use the (Kothari et al. 2005) model.
Kothari et al. (2005) found that discretionary accruals estimated by Jones and
modified Jones model are likely contain
some errors regarding firms performance,
so ROA is added in the model to control
firm performance. Consistent with our first
hypothesis, we use positive discretionary
accruals as an indicator of upward earnings
management. The Kothari et al. (2005)
model is as follows:
Where TAijt is total accrual for firm i,
in industry j in year t. Total accrual is
defined as earnings before extraordinary
and discontinued operation minus by operational cash flow. Aijt-1 is total asset for firm
i, in industry j in year t-1. ΔREVijt is change
in revenue for firm i, industry j in year t.
ΔRECijt is change in receivable for firm i,
industry j, in year t. PPEijt is total gross
property, plant, and equipment for firm i, in
industry j year t. ROAijt-1 is return on asset
for firm i, in industry j year t-1.
We estimate the model for each firm
year using all firm observation, exluding
financial industry, from the same industry
classification by Indonesian Stock Exchange. We assign value one for firms-year
with positive discretionary accruals as an
indicator of upward earnings management,
and value zero for firms-year with negative
discretionary accruals as an indicator of
downward earnings management.

Measurement of Downward Forecast
Guidance
We use following model to develop
proxy for downward forecast guidance. Ho
et al. (2010) also use this model to measure
downward forecast guidance following
(Matsumoto 2002). The model is as
follows:

Where ΔEPSijt is change in earnings
per share for firm i, in industry j in year t.
Pijt-1 is price per share for firm i, in industry
j in year t-1. CRETijt is cumulative daily
excess return for firm i, in industry j in year
t. Cumulative return measured from 3
(three) days after earnings announcement in
year t-1 until 20 (twenty) days before
earnings announcement in year t. Earnings
announcement date is based on publication
date listed in Thomson Reuters.
We estimate the above model for each
firm-year using all firm-years from the
same industry, excluding the firm for which
we are estimating the parameters. In this
paper, we limit the parameters only for all
firm-years with a complete earnings forecast data for period 2012 – 2014.
To determine the expected change in
EPS E[ΔEPS], we use following model
suggested
by
Matsumoto
(2002):

We add the expected change in EPS
to the earnings from the prior year to
estimate the expected forecast of the current
year’s earnings (E[FORE]). To determine
whether firms use downward forecast guidance, we compare the expected earnings
forecast (E[FORE]) with the most recent
earnings forecast prior to the early announcement date by analyst ([FORE]). We
categorize firms as 1 if if FORE firm i, in
industry j year t. ROAijt-1 is return on asset
for firm i, in industry j year t-1.
We estimate the model for each firm
year using all firm observation, exluding
financial industry, from the same industry
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Table 1
Measurement illustration of Personal Tenure between Audit Partners and CEOs

2012

2013

A

Year
2010
2011
Firm’s A CEO:
A
A

A

B

X

Audit Partner :
Y

X

Z

2009

X

Measurement of personal tenure between Audit partner
and CEO
A
X
1

A
X
2

classification by Indonesian Stock Exchange. We assign value one for firms-year
with positive discretionary accruals as an
indicator of upward earnings management,
and value zero for firms-year with negative
discretionary accruals as an indicator of
downward earnings management.
Measurement of Downward Forecast
Guidance
We use following model to develop
proxy for downward forecast guidance. Ho
et al. (2010) also use this model to measure
downward forecast guidance following
(Matsumoto 2002). The model is as
follows:

Where ΔEPSijt is change in earnings
per share for firm i, in industry j in year t.
Pijt-1 is price per share for firm i, in industry
j in year t-1. CRETijt is cumulative daily
excess return for firm i, in industry j in year
t. Cumulative return measured from 3
(three) days after earnings announcement in
year t-1 until 20 (twenty) days before earnings announcement in year t. Earnings
announcement date is based on publication
date listed in Thomson Reuters.
We estimate the above model for each
firm-year using all firm-years from the

A
Y
1

A
X
3

B
Z
1

same industry, excluding the firm for which
we are estimating the parameters. In this
paper, we limit the parameters only for all
firm-years with a complete earnings forecast data for period 2012 – 2014.
To determine the expected change in
EPS E[ΔEPS], we use following model
suggested by Matsumoto (2002):
We add the expected change in EPS
to the earnings from the prior year to
estimate the expected forecast of the current
year’s earnings (E[FORE]). To determine
whether firms use downward forecast guidance, we compare the expected earn-ings
forecast (E[FORE]) with the most recent
earnings forecast prior to the early announcement date by analyst ([FORE]). We
categorize firms as 1 if if FORE <
E[FORE], indicating the actual forecast is
less than the estimated forecast, consistent
with downward forecast guidance and 0 if
FORE≥ E[FORE], indicating the actual
forecast is higher than, or equal with the estimated forecast, inconsistent with downward forecast guidance.
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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Descriptive Statistic
The sample selection process can be
seen in Table 2. For full sample, the descriptive statistic is displayed in Table 3.
UPWARD_EM is variable that represent
upward earnings management. Based on
Table 3 the frequency of firm that has
positive discretionary accrual or firms that
conduct an upward earnings management
is 45% which means as much as 45 percent
of the total observations in this research is
the company that do upward earning
management. Slightly larger than UPWARD_EM, variable DOWNWARD-FG
shows that 47% of the sample conduct
downward earnings forecast guideline
practice. Table 3 also shows that 47% of
the sample that conduct trade off choose
downward forecast guidance but not upward earnings management and 53% do
trade off by choosing upward earnings
management but not downward forecast
guidance.
Personal tenure based on Table 3
shows that the maximum tenure of Audit
Partner and CEO of the client is five years.
Table 3 which is consist of full sample
shows that the average personal tenure is
1,9 years. From reduced sample to test hypothesis 2 and 3, the average of personal
tenure is 2 years. The comparison between
full sample and sample to test hypothesis 2
and 3 shows that the average of personal
tenure between sample is similar. Compare
to personal tenure the average tenure of firm
tenure, tenure between audit firm and the
company is 3,6 years, with the maximum
period of 6 years. From reduced sample to
test hypothesis 2 and 3, the average of firm
tenure is also similar which is 4 years. This
shows that in term of personal tenure the
duration is shorter compare to the firm
tenure.
Table 3 shows that the average of LTG
variable which control the growth rate of the
company is 2,9381. By using market to
book ratio, the average value of 2,9381
shows that the market value of the company

in average exceed almost 3 times of the
book value. This shows that the average
companies in the sample are growing
companies. Similar with the hypothesis 2
and 3 sample, the variable of LTG are 2.779
and 2.784 respectively, which show
consistency with full sample, that both
sample also from growing companies. LIT
variable is the control variable that controls
the litigation risk. Based on Table 3 for all
sample, most of the company has little
litigation risk. LABOR variable is the
control variable that represents the value of
the implicit claims to employees. The value
of LABOR for full sample in average is
0.5295 which implies that the company in
the sample is not highly labor intensive and
face a moderate claim to employee. For
hypothesis 2 and 3 sample the average
LABOR is 0.5103 and 0.5124, which
indicates the similar intensity with the full
sample. MVOE variable is the value of the
market value of equity that control size. In
the Table 3, MVOE variable presented in
the amount of billions of Rupiah. The value
of the average MVOE based on full sample
is 15.134 billion Rupiah. While the value of
the average MVOE variable on the model 2
and model 3 is 21.474 and 21.743 billion
Rupiah. The dispresion of the market value
of equity is very high which represents wide
deviation of the size of the companies in the
sample. The full sample and hypothesis 2
and 3 sample shows similar size of the
companies. The BIG 4 is a variable control
that represents the classification of the
auditor using auditor size, big 4 and non-big
4. Based on the descriptive statistics, the
frequency of companies audited by Big 4 is
49% and companies audited by Non Big 4
is 51%. From reduced sample to test
hypothesis 2 and 3, the companies audited
by Big 4 is 61% and 58% respectively.
Variable LEV is a variable control that
represents leverage. Based on the descriptive statistic of full sample, the average of
leverage is 13,94%, which shows that
13,94% of the asset was funded by debt.
Based on the industry classification, the de
scriptive statistic shows that companies
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Table 2
Sample Selection
Sample Selection
Model 1
Number of companies listed on BEI in 2012 – 2014

1,272

Number of companies included in the financial industry

-240

Number of companies that do not have complete data to estimate the value of dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables

-492

Number of observations for Model 1

540
Model 2

Number of observations from Model 1

540

Number of companies that do not have complete data on EPS estimated by analyst

-228

Number of observations for Model 2

312
Model 3

Number of observations from Model 2

312

Companies that have POSITIVE & DOWN = 1 and POSITIVE & DOWN = 0

-154

Number of observations for Model 3

158

from Service, Trading, and Investment
holds largest proportion of the sample,
23%, followed by property and mining.
Based on the Table 3, we can conclude that
the characteristic of the full sample and
sample for hypothesis 2 and 3 is quite
similar and there is no significant differences between sample for model 1, 2,
and 3.
Table 4 shows correlation between
variables. Based on the Table 3, Personal
Tenure has positive correlation with the
upward earnings management, downward
forecast guidance, and choice of trade-off
strategy by choosing downward forecast
guidance, but not upward earnings management. Initial indication from correlation
test shows that the higher tenure between
CEO and auditor the higher earnings
management in avoiding negative earnings surprises. Table 4 also shows that
Firm Tenure also has positive association

to the upward earnings management,
downward forecast guidance, and choice
of trade-off strategy by choosing downward forecast guidance, but not upward
earnings management. This result also
provides initial indication that the firm tenure increases the likelihood of firm doing
earnings management by avoiding negative earnings surprises.
Regression Result
This research uses multiple logistic
regression where the dependent variable of
this research is categorical or binary that is
discretionary accrual, downward forecast
forecast guidance, and choice of trade-off
strategy by choosing downward forecast
guidance, but not upward earnings management. While the independent variables
in this study include audit tenure Partners
and CEOs, tenure clients and KAP, growth
companies, companies categorized as
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Tabel 3.
Statistic Descriptive
Model 1: Number of Observation 540 firms years (Full Sample)
VARIABLE
MEAN
STD DEV
MIN
MAX
PTENURE
1.9129
0.9887
0
5
FTENURE
3.6111
1.6750
0
6
LTG
2.9381
4.0930
0.1425
26.6056
LABOR
0.5295
0.2937
0.0035
0.9965
MVOE
15134.21
39722.99
26.46
307675.00
LNMV
28.7228
1.9587
23.9989
33.3600
LEV
0.1394
0.1838
0
1.8583
Frequency of 1
Frequency of 0
UPWARD_EM
45%
55%
DOWNWARD_FG
47%
53%
CHOICE
47%
53%
LIT
10%
90%
BIG4
49%
51%
Percentage of firms in the sample based on the industry
MINING
14%
BASICCHEM
13%
CONSUMPTION
9%
STI
23%
AGRI
6%
PROP
19%
TRANS
10%
OTHER
6%
Model 2: Number of Observation 312 firms years
VARIABLE
MEAN
STD DEV
MIN
MAX
PTENURE
1.9807
1.0236
0
5
FTENURE
3.8461
1.6283
0
6
LTG
2.7790
2.4717
0.1425
12.2897
LABOR
0.5103
0.2840
0.0035
0.9892
MVOE
21474.73
43479.19
147.84
307675
LNMV
29.6433
1.4777
25.7194
33.3600
LEV
0.1570
0.1500
0.000
0.8560
Frequency of 1
Frequency of 0
DOWNWARD_FG
46%
54%
LIT
8%
92%
BIG4
61%
39%
Model 3: Number of Observation 158 firms years
VARIABLE
MEAN
STD DEV
MIN
MAX
PTENURE
2.0379
1.0459
0
5
FTENURE
4.0063
1.5121
0
6
LTG
2.7838
2.2838
0.2897
12.2897
LABOR
0.5124
0.2750
0.0035
0.9892
MVOE
21743.37
44425.55
147.84
307675
LNMV
29.6210
1.5409
25.7194
33.3600
LEV
0.1686
0.1636
0
0.8560
Frequency of 1
Frequency of 0
CHOICE
47%
53%
LIT
12%
88%
BIG4
58%
42%
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UPWARD_EM: upward earnings management measured by dummy variable with the value of 1 for firms
with positive discretionary accruals, indicating firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings management and
value of 0 for firms with negative discretionary accruals, indicating firms’ likelihood to do downward
earnings management.; DOWNWARD_FG: downward forecast guidance measured by dummy variable
with the value of 1 for firms with recent earnings forecast by analyst (FORE) is lower than expected
earnings forecast (E[FORE]), consistent with downward forecast guidance and value of 0 for firms with
recent earnings forecast by analyst (FORE) is higher than or equal with expected earnings forecast
(E[FORE]), inconsistent with downward forecast guidance; CHOISE: Trade-Off Choice Strategy
measured by dummy variable with the value of 1 for firms using downward forecast guidance, but not
upward earnings management (DOWNWARD_FG = 1 and UPWARD_EM = 0) and value of 0 for firms
for firms using upward earnings management but not downward forecast guidance (DOWNWARD_FG =
0 and UPWARD_EM = 1); PTENURE: Personal tenure between Audit Partner and CEO of the clients;
FTENURE: Firms Tenure between Public Accountant Firms and Client; LTG: the level of growth company; LIT: companies that have a high risk of litigation, dummy variable 1 is for companies in the industry
that has high risk of litigation and 0 otherwise; LABOR: implicit claims against employees; MVOE: market value of equity (in billions of Rupiah); LNMV: company size; BIG4: dummy variable 1 for companies
audited by Big 4 and 0 otherwise; LEV: level of leverage; MINING, BASICCHEM, CONSUMPTION,
STI, AGRI, PROP, TRANS, OTHER is dummy variable to classify industry, with TRANS as our industry reference.

litigation companies, implicit claims
against employees, company size, and
auditors BIG 4. Logistic regression testing
is done by using pool test. We show our
result examining the relation between
personal tenure between Audit Partner and
Client CEO with earnings surprise management in Tables 4 - 6 below. Table 4
shows the relation between personal tenure
of Audit Partner and Client CEO with
firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings
management, while Table 4 shows the
relation between personal tenure of Audit
Partner and Client CEO with firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings management,
while Table 4 shows the relation between
personal tenure of Audit Partner and Client
CEO with firms’ likelihood to do downward forecast guidance. Finally, we show
the relation between choice of trade-off
strategy by choosing downward forecast
guidance, but not upward earnings management with personal tenure of Audit
Partner and Client CEO in the Table 5.
Table 4 shows that PTENURE,
FTENURE, LABOR, and BIG4 are significantly related with the likelihood of
firms have positive discretionary accruals.
PTENURE is positively and significantly
affect the likelihood of firms do upward
earnings management, suggesting that the
longer period of personal tenure between

Audit Partner and Client CEO increase the
firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings
management. Our result support (Ball et al.
2015) that longer relation between Audit
Partner and Client CEO may impair the independence between Audit Partner and Client CEO. FTENURE is also positive and
significant. This means, consistent with the
result of PTENURE, longer relation between audit firms and client firms increased
firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings
management, characterized by the increase
of discretionary accruals (Johnson et al
2002). The magnitude of both variable is
nearly the same, suggesting that the important of personal tenure and firms’ tenure
is quite the same.
LABOR as control variable is positive and significant, shows that firms with
higher dependence on employee implicit
claims are tend to do upward earnings
management. This result is consistent with
Brown et al. (2005) stated that firms with
higher dependence on stakeholder implicit
will try to avoid negative earnings surprises
because the firm’s ability and reputation are
assessed by their employees.
BIG4 as control variable is negative
and significant, suggesting that firms using
Big 4 auditor have lower possibility to do
upward earnings management compared
with firms using non Big 4 auditor.
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Table 4.
Correlation Between Variables
Model 1 - Upward Earning Management
da
da

ptenure

ftenure

ltg

lit

labor

mvoe

lnmv

big4

lev

tambang

dasark~a

konsumsi

lainnya

jdi

pertan~n

properti

1

ptenure

0.0684

1

ftenure

0.0456

0.2125

1

ltg

0.0072

-0.0124

-0.0253

1

lit

0.0459

-0.0269

0.0959

-0.012

1

labor

0.1825

0.0078

0.0881

-0.0674

0.1512

1

mvoe

-0.0731

0.0334

0.0804

0.3233

-0.0557

-0.0137

1

lnmv

-0.0516

0.0738

0.2173

0.3323

-0.039

0.0367

0.5772

1

big4

-0.159

0.0258

0.2906

0.1473

0.1074

-0.1445

0.2724

0.4229

1

lev

0.0048

-0.0252

-0.0225

-0.1093

-0.1337

-0.1297

-0.0682

0.0342

-0.0307

1

tambang

-0.0296

-0.0297

-0.1467

-0.0548

-0.1339

-0.1438

-0.062

0.0136

-0.0378

0.0165

1

dasarkimi

-0.0229

0.073

0.0061

-0.0914

-0.1276

-0.2255

-0.0245

-0.1443

-0.0178

-0.0396

-0.1537

1

konsumsi

0.0261

0.0092

0.1621

0.3192

0.1456

-0.0553

0.2526

0.1718

0.1541

-0.1361

-0.1297

-0.1236

1

lainnya

-0.0132

-0.0167

-0.0054

-0.0479

-0.0077

-0.0409

0.1046

-0.0111

0.1226

-0.01

-0.1025

-0.0976

-0.0824

1

jdi

-0.0741

-0.0237

0.0576

0.0291

0.393

0.1194

-0.0836

-0.0738

0.098

-0.1392

-0.2181

-0.2079

-0.1754

-0.1386

1

pertanian

0.0023

0.0851

0.0685

0.0269

-0.085

-0.2199

-0.0386

0.051

-0.0166

0.03

-0.1025

-0.0976

-0.0824

-0.0651

-0.1386

1

properti

0.039

0.0377

-0.0292

-0.1141

-0.1609

0.3938

-0.1083

-0.0019

-0.2147

-0.0556

-0.1938

-0.1847

-0.1558

-0.1231

-0.2621

-0.1231

1
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Model 2 - Downward Forecast Guidance
down
down

ptenure

ftenure

ltg

lit

labor

mvoe

lnmv

big4

lev

tambang

dasark~a

konsumsi

lainnya

jdi

pertan~n

1

ptenure

0.0491

1

ftenure

0.065

0.1834

1

ltg

-0.0052

-0.0246

0.1045

1

lit

0.054

-0.0054

0.1343

0.0897

1

labor

0.0438

0.0629

0.05

0.0274

0.1611

1

mvoe

-0.0163

0.0362

0.0047

0.3631

-0.0505

-0.0331

1

lnmv

0.0417

0.0314

0.123

0.5185

-0.0082

0.0558

0.6829

1

big4

0.1413

-0.0471

0.1976

0.1625

0.0539

-0.2571

0.2393

0.3227

1

lev

-0.0464

0.0307

0.0332

-0.0816

-0.1503

0.0043

-0.1255

-0.1287

-0.2401

1

tambang

-0.0438

-0.0267

-0.14

-0.0634

-0.1312

-0.1426

-0.0813

-0.0459

0.0605

0.0939

1

dasarkimi

-0.102

0.0356

0.0179

-0.0278

-0.1163

-0.3231

0.0034

-0.1316

0.0374

-0.1002

-0.1612

1

konsumsi

0.0769

-0.0054

0.1413

0.3137

0.1485

-0.0922

0.2194

0.2294

0.0539

-0.0869

-0.1312

-0.1163

1

-0.0392

0.0585

0.0065

-0.0043

0.0705

-0.1175

0.2007

0.1056

0.1377

0.0134

-0.1055

-0.0935

-0.0762

1

0.1384

0.017

0.1519

0.1313

0.3855

0.1515

-0.0754

-0.0054

0.1493

-0.2007

-0.2016

-0.1787

-0.1455

-0.117

1

lainnya
jdi

properti

pertanian

-0.1261

0.076

0.0865

-0.1219

-0.0889

-0.2142

-0.0745

-0.0545

0.0038

0.057

-0.1231

-0.1091

-0.0889

-0.0714

-0.1365

1

properti

-0.0827

0.0251

-0.0289

-0.1241

-0.1502

0.4811

-0.1417

-0.0435

-0.2698

-0.03

-0.2081

-0.1844

-0.1502

-0.1207

-0.2307

-0.1409

1
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Model 3 - Choice
troff
troff

ptenure

ftenure

ltg

lit

labor

mvoe

lnmv

big4

lev

tambang

dasark~a

konsumsi

lainnya

jdi

pertan~n

1

ptenure

0.0262

1

ftenure

0.1053

0.1891

1

ltg

0.1762

0.0012

0.0608

1

lit

0.0772

-0.0508

0.1017

0.1481

1

labor

-0.0453

0.0629

0.0124

0.1017

0.1482

1

mvoe

0.0514

-0.0353

-0.0521

0.3784

-0.0749

-0.0032

1

lnmv

0.2335

0.0641

-0.0057

0.5353

-0.0215

0.1138

0.6658

1

big4

0.3568

-0.1546

0.123

0.1526

0.0718

-0.206

0.2478

0.3053

1

lev

-0.1015

0.0949

0.0077

-0.1868

-0.2059

-0.0393

-0.1108

-0.1812

-0.268

1

tambang

-0.1108

-0.05

-0.2366

-0.1652

-0.1448

-0.1742

-0.0662

-0.1216

0.0242

0.1449

1

dasarkimi

-0.0217

-0.1277

0.091

-0.0598

-0.1326

-0.385

-0.0902

-0.2691

0.0164

0.014

-0.1404

1

konsumsi

0.101

-0.0525

0.1517

0.3456

0.1339

-0.0681

0.2061

0.2445

0.0248

-0.0858

-0.1314

-0.1204

1

-0.0389

0.0653

0.0334

-0.0258

-0.0162

-0.1378

0.2564

0.1333

0.2173

-0.005

-0.1018

-0.0932

-0.0873

1

0.1499

0.04

0.1613

0.1791

0.4693

0.1924

-0.1158

-0.0125

0.1561

-0.2757

-0.205

-0.1878

-0.1758

-0.1361

1

pertanian

-0.0812

0.2187

0.1414

-0.0965

-0.106

-0.1878

-0.0663

-0.0213

0.0455

-0.0161

-0.1122

-0.1028

-0.0962

-0.0745

-0.1501

1

properti

-0.1888

0.0455

-0.1321

-0.1787

-0.1753

0.4183

-0.1356

-0.0182

-0.3678

-0.0904

-0.1856

-0.17

-0.1592

-0.1232

-0.2483

-0.1359

lainnya
jdi

properti

1
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Table 5.
Regression Result: Upward Earnings Management
Model for upward earnings management
UPWARD_EMit = αo + α1PTENUREit + α2FTENUREit + α3LTGit + α4LITit + α5LABORit + α6LNMVit +
α7BIG4it + α8LEVERAGEit + α9-15DINDUSTRYit + εit
Dependent Variable
UPWARD_EM
Independent
Predicted
Coefficient
Odds Ratio
Z
P>|z|
Variable
Sign
PTENURE
+
0.1559
1.1688
1.64
**0.050
FTENURE
+
0.0965
1.1014
1.57
**0.058
LTG
+/0.0307
1.0312
1.20
0.229
LIT
+/0.5168
1.6767
1.50
0.134
LABOR
+
1.4253
4.1593
3.75
***0.000
LNMV
+/-0.0529
0.9484
-0.94
0.348
BIG4
-0.6582
0.5178
-3.01
***0.001
LEVERAGE
+/-0.1225
0.8846
-0.22
0.826
DINDUSTRY
?
Included
Log Likelihood
-346.679
Prob>Chi2
0.000
Pseudo R2
0.067
Number of Observation: 540 firms years
Notes: *, **, and *** is a significance level on 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
UPWARD_EM: upward earnings management measured by dummy variable with the value of 1 for firms with
positive discretionary accruals, indicating firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings management and value of 0 for
firms with negative discretionary accruals, indicating firms’ likelihood to do downward earnings management.;
PTENURE: Personal tenure between Audit Partner and CEO of the clients; FTENURE: Firms Tenure between
Public Accountant Firms and Client; LTG: the level of growth company; LIT: companies that have a high risk of
litigation, dummy variable 1 is for companies in the industry that has high risk of litigation and 0 otherwise; LABOR:
implicit claims against employees; MVOE: market value of equity (in billions of Rupiah); LNMV: company size;
BIG4: dummy variable 1 for companies audited by Big 4 and 0 otherwise; LEV: level of leverage; MINING,
BASICCHEM, CONSUMPTION, STI, AGRI, PROP, TRANS, OTHER is dummy variable to classify industry,
with TRANS as our industry reference.

The regression result of downward
forecast guidance model is presented in Table 6. PTENURE and BIG4 are significantly related to downward forecast
guidance. PTENURE variable is positive
and significance. It shows that longer personal tenure between Audit Partner and Client CEO increases firms’ likelihood to do
downward forecast guidance. This result
shows that that the company is also doing
downward forecast guidance. The result is
consistent with what was suggested by
(Sankaraguruswamy and Sweeney 2005)
that management is responsive to analyst
careers. Forcing analysts to lower their
earnings estimates can help corporate
management avoid negative earnings surprises. But if the gap between the estimated
earnings of analysts and profits announced

by the company is too far, it will be
dangerous analyst position. Gaps that are
too far can be interpreted by investors as a
lack of professionalism of analysts. Investors no longer believe in earnings estimates
by analysts, which will then have an impact
on the career of the analyst. So to overcome
this, management performs a combination
of upward earning management and downward forecast guidance. Company management may ask the analyst to lower the company's earnings estimate reasonably, or in
other words the profit published by the
analyst is not too low to maintain the career
of the analyst. Then to meet the earnings estimates from analysts, management will
also make upward earnings management,
but with lower intensity than without
downward forecast guidance.
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While BIG4 variable is positive and
significant, indicating that firms using Big
4 auditor are more likely to do downward
forecast guidance. Other variables are consistent with previous result. In the
Indonesian context, the results of this study
indicate that although most firms in
Indonesia are dominated by family firms
with concentrated ownership structures,
managers still have an incentive to earn
earnings management by avoiding negative
earnings surprises if there is low independence of auditors viewed from tenure
personal between partner and CEO. The
results of this study indicate that with the
increasing length of personal tenure managers have an incentive to perform avoidance of negative earnings surprises by upward accrual earnings management and
downward forecast guidance.
The regression result of Choice model
is presented in Table 7. Table 7 shows that
PTENURE and BIG4 are significantly related to the choice of using downward forecast guidance, but not upward earnings
management. PTENURE variable is positive and significance. Inconsistent with our
hypothesis, the result shows that longer individual of Audit Partner and Client CEO
will increase firms’ likelihood to do downward forecast guidance without using upward earnings management. BIG 4 as control variable is positive and significant, suggesting firms using Big 4 auditor are more
likely to do downward forecast guidance
without using upward earnings management.
In overall, consistent with the first
two hypotheses our results show that
PTENURE is positively and significantly
associated with the likelihood of firms do
upward earnings management and downward forecast guidance. PTENURE also
positively significant associated with the
likelihood of firms do downward forecast
guidance but not upward earnings management. Our result indicates that the longer
personal tenure between Audit Partner and
Client CEO increase the likelihood of both
mechanisms of earnings management by

avoiding negative earnings surprises. For
firms that do trade-off between the two
mechanism, this study shows that personal
tenure increases the likelihood firms to
choose downward forecast guidance but not
upward earnings management.
Our result support (Sankaraguruswamy and Sweeney 2005) suggesting
that firm’s manager can influence analyst
forecast. Forcing analyst to lower the
earnings forecast may help firms to avoid
negative earnings surprise, but if the gap
between the actual earnings reported and
earnings forecast by analyst too huge, it
could harm analyst position. Huge gap of
actual earnings reported and earnings forecast can be interpreted by investor as analyst error and lack of professionalism. To
address this issue, firm’s managers and
analyst may develop a symbiotic relationship regarding earnings announcements and
earnings forecasts (Ho et al. 2010). If
managers plan to announce earnings that
are lower than analyst forecast, they have
an incentive to manage analyst expectations
downward, but they try to manage small
gap differences between earnings reported
and earnings forecast. In addition, to
achieve certain level of earnings, firms
managers will do upward earnings management, but with less extreme.
FTENURE is significant and positive
for upward earnings management. However, we do not find any relation between
FTRENURE with downward forecast guidance and firm’s choice to do downward
forecast guidance, but not upward earnings
management. This means that longer audit
firm tenure only increase firms’ likelihood
to do upward earnings management. The
same result also goes to LABOR, indicating
that firms with high dependence on employee implicit claim are more likely to do
upward earnings management only.
BIG4 is negative and significant for
upward earnings management, but shows
positive and significant for both downward
forecast guidance and firm’s choice to do
downward forecast guidance, but not upward earnings management. It indicates
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Table 6.
Regression Result: Downward Forecast Guidance
Model for Downward Forecast Guidance
DOWNWARD_FGit = βo + β1PTENUREit + β2FTENUREit + β3LTGit + β4LITit + β5LABORit + β6LNMVit
+ β7BIG4it + β8LEVERAGEit + α9-15DINDUSTRYit + εit
Dependent Variable
DOWNWARD_FG
Independent
Predicted
Coefficient
Odds Ratio
Z
P>|z|
Variable
Sign
PTENURE
0.1939
1.2141
1.58
**0.056
FTENURE
+
0.0745
1.0773
0.89
0.186
LTG
+/-0.0695
0.9328
-1.15
0.250
LIT
+/-0.1983
0.8201
-0.41
0.683
LABOR
+
0.1296
1.1384
0.23
0.411
LNMV
+/-0.0373
0.9634
-0.35
0.723
BIG4
0.6513
1.9840
2.29
***0.011
LEVERAGE
+/-0.8549
0.4253
-0.92
0.355
DINDUSTRY
?
Included
Log Likelihood
-197.509
Prob>Chi2
0.0016
Pseudo R2
0.0840
Number of Observation: 312 firms years
Notes: *, **, and *** is a significance level on 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
DOWNWARD_FG: downward forecast guidance measured by dummy variable with the value of 1 for firms with
recent earnings forecast by analyst (FORE) is lower than expected earnings forecast (E[FORE]), consistent with
downward forecast guidance and value of 0 for firms with recent earnings forecast by analyst (FORE) is higher than
or equal with expected earnings forecast (E[FORE]), inconsistent with downward forecast guidance; PTENURE:
Personal tenure between Audit Partner and CEO of the clients; FTENURE: Firms Tenure between Public Accountant
Firms and Client; LTG: the level of growth company; LIT: companies that have a high risk of litigation, dummy
variable 1 is for companies in the industry that has high risk of litigation and 0 otherwise; LABOR: implicit claims
against employees; MVOE: market value of equity (in billions of Rupiah); LNMV: company size; BIG4: dummy
variable 1 for companies audited by Big 4 and 0 otherwise; LEV: level of leverage; MINING, BASICCHEM,
CONSUMPTION, STI, AGRI, PROP, TRANS, OTHER is dummy variable to classify industry, with TRANS as
our industry reference.

that firms using Big4 auditor are likely to
use downward forecast guidance and tradeoff between downward forecast guidance
and upward earnings management.
Sensitivity Test
We perform sensitivity analysis by replacing the measurement of expected earnings to determine the downward forecast
guidance with expected earning using naïve
random walk suggested by (Ball and Watts
1972). Random walk model suggest that
firms’ expected EPS in year t will be the
same with EPS of previous year.
The formula of random walk model
is as follows:
EPS[FORE-RW]t = EPS t-1

EPS[FORE-RW] t is the earnings per share
estimation of firm i in the year of t using
random walk model. EPS t-1 is the EPS of
firm i in the year of t-1.
DOWNWARD_FG is valued at 1 if
EPS[FORE] t < EPS[FORE-RW]t, which
means that current period of analyst earnings forecast is smaller than earnings expectation using random walk model. DOWNWARD_FG is valued at 0 if EPS[FORE] t
≥ EPS[FORE-RW]t, which means that current period of analyst earnings forecast is
larger than than earnings expectation using
random walk model.
By using the random walk assumption, the result from model 2 and model 3
test show consistent result. PTENURE is
positively affect the likelihood of firms
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Table 7.
Regression Result: Choice
Model for Choice
CHOICE it = γo + γ1PTENUREit + γ2FTENUREit + γ3LTGit + γ4LITit + γ5LABORit + γ6LNMVit + γ7BIG4it
+ γ8LEVERAGEit + α9-15DINDUSTRYit + εit
Dependent Variable
CHOICE
Independent
Predicted
Coefficient
Odds Ratio
Z
P>|z|
Variable
Sign
PTENURE
0.3106
1.3643
1.62
**0.52
FTENURE
+
0.1132
1.1199
0.81
0.240
LTG
+/0.0049
1.0049
0.05
0.964
LIT
+/0.1713
1.1869
0.26
0.796
LABOR
+
-0.9367
0.3918
-1.04
0.149
LNMV
+/0.1530
1.1653
0.92
0.360
BIG4
1.6297
5.1027
3.46
***0.000
LEVERAGE
+/-1.1351
0.3213
-0.79
0.432
DINDUSTRY
?
Included
Log Likelihood
-88.054
Prob>Chi2
0.0002
Pseudo R2
0.1945
Number of Observation: 158 firms years
Notes: *, **, and *** is a significance level on 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
CHOSE: Trade-Off Choice Strategy measured by dummy variable with the value of 1 for firms using downward
forecast guidance, but not upward earnings management (DOWNWARD_FG = 1 and UPWARD_EM = 0) and value
of 0 for firms for firms using upward earnings management but not downward forecast guidance (DOWNWARD_FG
= 0 and UPWARD_EM = 1); PTENURE: Personal tenure between Audit Partner and CEO of the clients;
FTENURE: Firms Tenure between Public Accountant Firms and Client; LTG: the level of growth company; LIT:
companies that have a high risk of litigation, dummy variable 1 is for companies in the industry that has high risk of
litigation and 0 otherwise; LABOR: implicit claims against employees; MVOE: market value of equity (in billions
of Rupiah); LNMV: company size; BIG4: dummy variable 1 for companies audited by Big 4 and 0 otherwise; LEV:
level of leverage; MINING, BASICCHEM, CONSUMPTION, STI, AGRI, PROP, TRANS, OTHER is dummy
variable to classify industry, with TRANS as our industry reference.

doing downward forecast guidance and the
likelihood of firms doing downward forecast guidance without doing upward earnings management.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the relation
of personal tenure between Audit Partner
and Client CEO with the underlying ways
firm manage their earnings surprise mechanisms. Since firms tend to avoid negative
earnings surprise, we use two mechanisms
which are upward earnings management
and downward forecast guidance. We also
examine whether personal tenure affect the
option of trade-off behaviour between the
two mechanisms.

Our results show that longer personal
tenure between Audit Partner and Client
CEO is significantly related to firms’ likelihood to do upward earnings management
and downward forecast guidance. The result shows that the longer the personal
tenure between Audit Partner and Client
CEO, firms tend to avoid negative earnings
surprise by using upward earnings management and downward forecast guidance. For
firms that perform trade-off, this study
shows that personal tenure positively associated with the likelihood of firms choosing
downward forecast guidance without upward earnings management.
Several limitations should be noted
from this study. One of limitation of this
study is not considering the personal tenure
between audit partner and CFO. This study
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use Audit Partner – Client CEO personal
tenure relationship following (Ball et al.
2015) since CEO has important role in
involving in auditor appointment decision.

CFO has also important role in the appointment of auditor decision. Further study
might also explore the role of personal tenure between audit partner (or key person in
the audit team) with CFO. Next, this study
limits the measurement of personal tenure
and firm tenure from 2009 for observation
period of 2012-2014. Further study can extend backward period in order to measure
the personal tenure. Third, this study use
Litigation as variable control and measured
by dummy variable with value one assigned
for firms in high litigation industries which
are bio-technology, computer, electronic,
and re-tailing industry, and value zero
assigned for otherwise. In Indonesia, these
industries may not have the same level of
litigation risk compare to in US or other
countries.
Last, despite of using Indonesia as the
context, this study does not consider the differences of the ownership structure in the
companies. This study does not test whether
the relationship between personal tenure
and earnings management mechanisms is
different between companies with family
ownership or between high and low concentration of ownership or between companies that have CEO from family or not.
Further study might consider the effect of
ownership and whether CEO is part of the
family or not in considering the relationship
between personal tenure and earnings
management mechanisms.
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